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Recent academic studies report that increases in household debt are associated with lower 
output growth, higher unemployment, and greater probability of future banking crises (Mian et al. 
2017; Jordà et al. 2016).1 These relationships became particularly evident in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, where overborrowing by subprime households led to a rise in defaults and 
foreclosures, and triggered the collapse of the US housing market and the subsequent great 
recession (Sanders 2008; Mian and Sufi 2009, 2014a, 2014b). Theoretically, this relationship can 
be explained by the presence of aggregate demand externalities associated with high household 
debt, which may lead to a supply-constrained economy during recessions (see Eggertsson and 
Krugman 2012; Korinek and Simsek 2016). In addition, behavioral factors and heterogenous 
beliefs may also play an important role, as investors and households exhibit over-optimism during 
periods of housing booms (e.g., Cheng et al. 2014) or neglect crash risks due to over-optimism 
(Baron and Xiong 2017).  
The renewed rise in household debt worldwide may be additional cause for concern, in that 
household debt has continued to grow significantly since 2008 across 80 countries (see Figure 1).2 
In advanced economies, the median debt ratio rose from 52 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2008 to 63 percent in 2016. Among emerging market economies, the median debt ratio 
increased from 15 to 21 percent of GDP over the same period. Evidently, the global financial crisis 
does not seem to have deterred households from taking on more debt. While this may be optimal 
in a low interest rate environment, this may eventually come back to hurt households when they 
face a rising debt service once interest rates start rising and the credit boom ends (Drehman et al. 
2017). 
Figure 1 here 
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Conversely, higher household borrowing could also improve economic efficiency and 
enhance macro-financial stability. Households may borrow to smooth fluctuations in consumption 
(Hall 1978), and they may also borrow to invest in financial or non-financial assets, such that 
higher household borrowing today may be associated with higher future GDP growth (see, e.g., 
Beck and Levine 2004; Beck et al. 2000; Levine 1998). Yet the long-term positive effect on output 
growth may fade once private sector debt reaches a certain threshold, due to rising financial 
stability risks and misallocation of resources (Arcand et al. 2015; Sahay et al. 2015). 
This chapter re-examines the relationship between household debt and future GDP growth 
for a much broader sample of countries than hitherto studied and explores several propagation 
mechanisms. In particular, we address the following questions:  
(1) In a broad set of countries, is the intertemporal relationship between household debt and output 
growth heterogenous?  
(2) Do certain institutional factors and financial frictions associated with household debt amplify 
the impact of negative shocks?  
(3) What channels can explain the relationship between household debt and output growth?  
Our main findings are several. First, the negative relationship between household debt 
growth and future GDP growth, documented in Mian et al. (2017) for 30 countries, is generalized 
to a much larger set of 80 advanced and emerging market and developing economies. This is a 
new result indicating that the negative relationship is not a phenomenon of advanced economies 
only. Second, the negative effects of household debt on future GDP depend on individual 
household level debt and country characteristics, including the exchange rate regime, capital 
account openness, financial development, and transparency indicators. This highlights the 
important role of institutional and financial frictions in amplifying negative shocks. Third, this 
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negative relationship can be attributed to three complementary mechanisms: (1) household credit 
booms are reflected in a higher future probability of banking crises; (2) rapid increases in 
household debt are associated with a neglect of crash risks; and (3) the macro effect of a debt 
overhang situation, which depends on differences in marginal propensities to consume across 
households. It is a surprising new finding that higher household debt growth is systematically 
associated with lower asset prices in the future, suggesting the role of sentiment that is uniquely 
associated with household credit. Together, these pieces of evidence suggest that household debt 
should be monitored vigilantly and incorporated into central banks’ policy frameworks. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we first review the role of household and corporate debt 
in macro-financial models. Next, we present new results on the negative relationship between 
household debt and future output growth for a large panel data set and examine the role of various 
institutional factors and distributional (micro-household level) characteristics. Then, we examine 
three complimentary mechanisms that help explain this negative relationship, including the effect 
of household debt on the probability of banking crises, neglected downside risks and debt overhang 
on household consumption. A final section concludes. 
 
The Role of Debt in Macro-Financial Models 
The impact of shocks on the macroeconomy can be amplified by financial frictions. Much 
existing literature focuses on the implications of productivity shocks on the supply side of the 
economy (see Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy 2003; and Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014). In these theoretical models, 
nonfinancial corporations face financial frictions such as collateral constraints. Positive 
productivity or monetary policy shocks that relax these constraints lead to increased borrowing 
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and investment and higher asset prices which may further relax the constraints. As a result, such 
shocks can amplify business cycle dynamics.  
A recent strand of literature has emphasized a debt-driven demand channel of credit supply 
shocks for the business cycle. While the underlying borrowing constraint mechanism is the same 
as in earlier models, when credit supply tightens after a credit boom, nominal rigidities, monetary 
policy constraints, and other frictions may exacerbate the downward pressure on growth (see 
Eggertsson and Krugman 2012; Korinek and Simsek 2016, Farhi and Werning 2016). In these 
models, households increase borrowing to finance consumption when credit constraints are 
relaxed. But when credit constraints later tighten, borrowers must deliver by cutting back 
consumption. While borrowing decisions are optimal from the individual household perspective, 
they can be excessive relative to the social optimal level as monetary policy is unable to stimulate 
demand from savers due to monetary policy constraints and/or nominal rigidities such as fixed 
exchange rate regimes. 
In such cases, a positive shock to the credit constraint of borrowers could have amplified 
effects on the macroeconomy. In the aggregate, there would be a decline in economic growth after 
household credit booms as in Mian et al. (2017) who were among the first to document the 
household debt cycle at the global level. In their study of 30 advanced economies, they emphasize 
a debt-driven ‘consumption’ channel in which households may rationally borrow more than the 
socially optimal level when their credit constraints are relaxed. They argue that the channel is a 
distinct one that has implications for policies, particularly macroprudential policies. Jorda and 
others (2016) found that large credit booms (and mortgage booms since WWII) led to deeper 
recessions and slower recoveries for 17 advanced economies since 1870. Brunnermeier et al. 
(2017) examined the relation between US household credit expansions, financial market stress, 
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output growth, and other macroeconomic aggregates over the period 1973-2015. They found that 
monetary policy was an important driver of the relationship between credit and output. By contrast, 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) emphasize the role of macroprudential policies to contain credit booms, 
as capital flows and currency substitution limit the effectiveness of monetary policy in 170 
countries to the 1960s. 
Another strand of the literature finds that household borrowing may be subject to 
behavioral biases stemming from differences in household consumption patterns or mispricing of 
risk in financial markets. For example, the present bias of consumption and/or extrapolative 
expectations by households may lead to excessive borrowing when positive credit shocks hit the 
economy, but these could lead to a significant drop in consumption when credit constraints tighten 
(Laibson 1997; Cheng et al. 2014). Heterogeneous beliefs and/or the underestimation of risks 
associated with household debt can also lead to more pronounced leverage cycles and more volatile 
asset prices (Geanakoplos 2010; Baron and Xiong 2017).  
More recently, several studies have shown that demographics and the distribution of 
income and debt matter. Younger households, which anticipate future income growth, could 
borrow more against their future incomes (Blundell et al. 1994). Rajan (2010) and Kumhof et al. 
(2015) argue that increased income and wealth inequality produced rapid growth in household debt 
in the United States and eventually to the financial crisis in 2008. Coibion et al. (2017) find that, 
over the period 2001–2012, income inequality may have indirectly operated as a screening device 
for banks, given that they loaned less to low-income households in high-inequality regions in the 
United States. 
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New Empirical Results on Household Debt and GDP  
 Next, we document the relationship between current increases in household debt and future 
GDP growth in a large set of 80 countries. Our goal is to examine the role of institutional factors 
and distributional characteristics. 
Household debt and output growth in 80 countries. We document the relationship between 
current increases in household debt and future GDP growth in 80 countries, including 39 advanced 
economies and 41 emerging market economies, with data spanning the period 1950–2016.3 The 
large size of the sample allows us to confirm prior findings and explore the role of cross-country 
differences. Following Mian et al. (2017), we first study a forecasting equation which examines 
the relationship between current changes in the household debt to GDP ratio and future real income 
growth, controlling for current changes in the non-financial corporate debt to GDP ratio, country 
and time fixed effects, and other variables such as the past level of household debt to GDP ratio. 
The equation is estimated as an unbalanced panel regression, with standard errors clustered by 
both year and country. The forecasting equation is as follows: 
Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽ℎΔ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 
 
where Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 ≡ log � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘−3�, 𝑦𝑦 is real GDP, Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 �𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 �𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4 is the 
past three-year change in the household debt ratio, Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ �𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺 �𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 −
�
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡
𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺
�
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4 is the past three-year change in corporate debt ratio, and  𝑋𝑋  includes control 
variables such as lagged GDP growth for the preceding two years and the past three-year change 
7 
in the government debt to GDP ratio. In this regression model, a negative estimate for 𝛽𝛽ℎ would 
indicate that household debt growth forecasts lower future income growth; a positive estimate for 
𝛽𝛽ℎ would indicate the opposite. Country and year fixed effects are included to absorb the level 
effects of each country and year. Standard errors are dually clustered at the country-year level. We 
repeat this forecasting equation for varying horizons k from the current year (k = 0) to six years 
ahead (k = 6).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics on household debt and the main variables used in this 
chapter. The mean household debt to GDP ratio across the sample was 35 percent, and the mean 
annual increase was about 1 percentage point. This compares to 60 percent for firm debt to GDP, 
increasing by slightly less than 1 percentage point per year, and the public debt to GDP ratio of 52 
percent on average, rising by 2 percentage points per year. The data also exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity, with household debt to GDP ratios at the 10th and 90th percentiles, for example, 
ranging between 6 and 72 percent. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 reports our regression results. In Panel A, the coefficients on the household debt to 
GDP ratio are strongly negative for forecasting horizons from current year to six years ahead.4 In 
other words, current growth in household debt relative to GDP is associated with lower future 
income growth. Regression results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The negative 
effect is the strongest at the three to four-year horizon and diminishes as the horizon increases. 
Additional results (not reported here) show that the effects remain significant when the sample is 
split in several ways (before/after the year 2000, and before/after the global financial crisis). 
Table 2 here 
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The effects are also economically significant. The three-year change in household debt to 
GDP ratio has a standard deviation of 5.89 percentage points, and a one standard deviation increase 
in the household debt ratio is associated with 1.2 percentage points lower GDP growth over a 
three-year horizon. Compared to the effect of corporate debt, household debt has a stronger 
negative effect on future GDP growth, and the effect lasts for much longer than corporate debt. 
The standard deviation for three-year change in the corporate debt to GDP ratio is 18.97 percentage 
points, three times that for household debt. Also, the coefficients on corporate debt are more than 
three times smaller than those for household debt, and negative and significant effects of corporate 
debt on future income are absent at forecasting horizons beyond four to five years.  Hence, these 
results are broadly consistent with Mian et al. (2017) who study a sample of 30 mostly advanced 
economies. We also verify this relationship using a panel vector auto-regression (VAR) approach 
for a smaller set of countries but including house prices and short-term interest rates as additional 
factors.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we further split the sample into advanced economies and emerging 
markets. Columns 1–4 present results for 39 advanced economies. The correlation between past 
growth in household debt and future income growth is negative and statistically significant, with 
a forecasting horizon of one to five years. The negative effect diminishes at the seven-year horizon. 
Columns 5–8 present the same regression results for emerging markets. The negative correlation 
is still present, although statistical significance is weak at the three- and five-year horizons due to 
the shorter data span for many emerging market economies. The results are robust to adding 
additional control variables to account for cyclical factors, such as the lagged unemployment rate, 
a short-term interest rate, and real effective exchange rates. Results (not reported here) remain both 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
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What drives this negative relationship of household debt overhang on the macroeconomy? 
To date, empirical analysis using micro-level data has been performed for a few advanced 
economies, specifically the United States, where data quality permits such in-depth treatment (e.g., 
Mian and Sufi 2014a). Many prior papers focus on the deleverage episode after a large negative 
shock (such as a house price shock) and examine how households with different leverage ratios 
respond. These studies provide well-designed identification strategies, yet they can suffer from 
external validity problems. Below, we provide complementary evidence of such micro-level 
impacts on the macroeconomy using European data. 
In our analysis, the cross-country setting provides a natural dimension of variation across 
countries and can potentially overcome external validity issues when considering macro-financial 
policies at the country level or across countries. Hence, we examine the role of institutional factors 
that may affect the relationship between household debt and GDP growth.  
Institutional factors and distributional characteristics. Next, we examine the sensitivity of 
the household debt-GDP relationship to the role of the exchange rate regime, capital account 
openness, financial development, mortgage participation rates of low-income households, and 
the average debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of low-income households. These institutional factors 
and distributional characteristics capture the degree of institutional and financial frictions in the 
economy. Specifically, we conduct the following regression analysis: 
Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 , 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for an institutional factor or distributional characteristic of household 
debt. The forecasting horizon is fixed at five years for illustrative purposes, but qualitatively 
similar results are obtained when using different forecasting horizons (three or seven years). The 
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coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽2. We are interested in examining whether certain institutional factors 
and distributional characteristics of household debt can mitigate or reinforce the effect of 
household debt.  
Exchange rate regime and capital account openness. An increase in household debt corresponds to 
a transfer of funds from households that save to households that borrow. Household borrowers 
increase their leverage and pay down their debt over time, so a negative credit constraint shock to 
borrowers would lead to forced deleveraging by the borrowers who must cut back consumption 
(see Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). When this happens, and to avoid an aggregate decline in 
consumption, optimal monetary policy should lower interest rates to encourage consumption by 
savers in the economy. 5 Failure to raise consumption by savers would result in a decline in 
aggregate demand and economic recession. 
Flexibility in monetary policy is essential in this situation. Constraints to monetary policy, 
such as the zero lower bound, can prevent a rise in consumption by savers sufficiently to fully 
offset the consumption drop by borrowers.  A fixed exchange rate regime would also impose 
limitations on monetary policy. When monetary policy faces such constraints, one would expect 
that the negative effects of household debt growth on future income growth would be stronger. To 
examine this empirically, we use the IMF classification of exchange rate regimes for all 80 
countries in our sample. The classification has six categories including fixed exchange rate regime, 
freely floating exchange rate regime, and categories in between. We generate an indicator variable 
for a fixed exchange rate regime, which takes value 1 if the country is classified as having a fixed 
exchange rate regime, and 0 otherwise.  
Regression results are reported in the first two columns of Table 3. Column 1 shows results 
controlling for firm debt and lagged GDP growth. The interaction term between past household 
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debt growth and the indicator for fixed exchange rate regime is negative and highly significant, 
while household debt growth by itself becomes insignificant. This indicates that having a fixed 
exchange rate regime which limits monetary policy flexibility compounds the negative effect of 
household debt on future income, consistent with our hypothesis.6  
Table 3 here 
Columns 2 and 3 take into account the impact of high capital account openness, defined as 
having a capital account openness index above the median. Column 2 suggests that a higher 
reliance on external funding may amplify the negative effect of household debt on future GDP 
growth. Results for the fixed exchange rate regime and high capital account openness are rebust 
when both variables are included in the regression (Column 3). In both cases, there is a very 
significant interaction of these institutional factors with household debt growth, while household 
debt growth by itself is insignificant. 
Financial development, transparency, and financial risk index. If a country has a better developed 
financial system, more transparent credit information about borrowers, and a better financial risk 
index, a rise in household debt is likely to be associated with a less negative impact on future 
growth. We use the Financial Development Index to capture how well the financial system can 
allocate credit in general: the high Financial Development Index takes the value of 1 if the 
Financial Development Index is within the top quartile of all countries in the sample as of 2014, 
and 0 otherwise. We also use the Transparency Index and Financial Risk Index to capture the 
degree of credit information transparency and financial risk, respectively. 
Regression results are reported in Columns 4–6 of Table 3. In Column 4, we see that when 
the Financial Development Index is high (e.g., the indicator takes the value of 1, the negative effect 
of household debt is mitigated significantly. The magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction 
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term is the same as the coefficient on the household debt term, suggesting that the negative effects 
are concentrated in countries where the Financial Development Index is low. Similar effects are 
found for better transparency and better financial risk (Columns 5 and 6), although the coefficient 
on the interaction term is smaller in magnitude.  
These results suggest that better and more efficient financial markets and institutions can 
help overcome the negative medium-term macro-financial effects associated with rising household 
debt. This may reflect the fact that credit growth is less risky in more financially developed 
countries because their financial systems are, on average, better able to assess credit risk and 
allocate credit, and to deal with the consequences.  
Distributional characteristics. To further distinguish the effect of debt overhang, we explore the 
distributional characteristics of household debt. As shown in Figure 2, distributional characteristics 
of household debt can contain valuable information.7 In the theoretical framework of Korinek and 
Simsek (2016), differences in marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) between borrowers and 
savers can generate negative aggregate effects stemming from debt overhang on consumption. In 
other words, aggregate debt concentrated in low-income households would likely have very 
different implications on the macroeconomy compared to the same level of aggregate household 
debt uniformly allocated across all income groups, because the average MPCs of borrowers and 
savers in these two cases are very different. 
Figure 2 here 
In addition, cross-sectional differences in the characteristics of household debt holders are 
empirically extremely important when analyzing the role of household debt. For example, Mian 
and Sufi (2009) show convincingly that a key driver of the US subprime crisis was the fast 
accumulation of household debt in US zip codes that had the lowest income growth. Mian and Sufi 
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(2014a) also contrast the negative outcomes during the Great Recession in US counties having 
high household leverage with those having low leverage. These studies highlight the importance 
of looking at distributional characteristics of household debt in addition to the information 
contained in the aggregate household debt.8  
We focus here on two distributional characteristics of household debt are considered: (1) 
the mortgage participation rate of low-income households (i.e., the lowest two quintiles in the 
income distribution); and (2) the (weighted) average debt-to-income ratio of low-income 
households. We generate these measures based on the latest available micro-level data for 30 
countries. The mortgage participation rate of low-income households is an indicator of an 
economy’s degree of financial development since a higher mortgage participation rate for low-
income households is likely associated with a banking sector that can efficiently screen borrowers 
based on relatively transparent information and determine their credit risk. In countries where 
mortgage participation rate is low for low-income households, such financial intermediation is 
likely less efficient.  
We rank all countries by their mortgage participation rates for the low-income households 
(bottom two quintiles in income distribution) and generate an indicator LowIncPart. This indicator 
takes the value of 1 if the mortgage participation rate for the bottom 40 percent of households in 
the income distribution ranks highly (within the top quartile of countries; roughly above 20%), and 
0 otherwise. Column 7 of Table 3 shows the regression results, which indicate that a high mortgage 
participation rate for low-income households mitigates the negative effects of household debt on 
future income growth. Qualitatively and quantitatively, this result is similar to that for the Financial 
Development Index, although the latter is estimated using the larger sample of 80 countries. Both 
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results show that financial development, including inclusive financial services, mitigates the 
negative impact of household debt overhang on the real economy. 
The other indicator, LowDTI, captures the average debt-to-income ratio of low-income 
households (bottom 40% of income distribution) weighted by the share of debt held by these 
households as a percent of total outstanding household debt in the economy. LowDTI takes the 
value of 1 if the weighted DTI for these households is low (within the lowest quartile of all 
countries), and 0 otherwise. Columns 8–9 of Table 3 report regression results, which suggest that 
a low average DTI for low-income households reduces the negative impact of aggregate household 
debt on the economy, although statistical significance is weaker. This result remains when the 
interaction with emerging market (EM) indicator is controlled (Column 9). In other words, high 
indebtedness of low-income borrowers would likely worsen the negative impact. This is consistent 
with theoretical models by Korinek and Simsek (2016) and empirical evidence by Mian and Sufi 
(2014a).  
In sum, debt participation and average DTI capture two distinct aspects of financial access 
by low-income households. The former is related to financial inclusion and financial development, 
while the latter points the potential danger of over-indebtedness of low-income households. They 
appear to have different implications for macroeconomic growth.  
 
What Explains the Household Debt-Future GDP Relation? 
This section evaluates the role of three complementary mechanisms through which 
increases in household debt may be associated with lower future output growth. More specifically, 
we examine whether household debt is associated with systemic banking crises and behavioral 
biases (mispricing in equities), and whether debt overhang affects consumption. 
15 
Household Credit Booms and Systemic Banking Crises. We examine whether household debt 
has distinct information value for predicting banking crises, and whether the level of debt plays a 
role. If so, we can establish that household credit growth plays a crucial role in the amplification 
and generation of macroeconomic shocks. This expands on Schularick and Taylor (2012) who 
found that total private credit helps predict financial crises in 14 advanced economies since the 
1870s. Here, we decompose total private credit into household and nonfinancial corporate debt. 
We estimate a probabilistic model of systemic banking crises in country i and year t: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡]
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 0|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡] = Ψ0i + Ψ1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + Ψ2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 x I(Hi Debt)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 
where the dependent variable is the log of the odds ratio, Xit refers to a vector of lagged changes 
and levels of household and corporate debt (scaled by GDP) ratios, and the third term of the 
regression refers to interactions between X and an indicator function I (Hi Debt). The latter takes 
value of 1 if country i experiences household or sovereign debt exceeding various thresholds.9 
Finally, Ψ0i  are country fixed effects (FE), to control for time-invariant country-specific 
characteristics. 10 
Past studies show that household debt can be a good early warning indicator for banking 
crises (Gourinchas and Obstfeld 2012; Drehmann and Tastaronis 2014; Jordà et al. 2016). Using 
a logit panel estimation covering 34 countries over the period 1970–2015, both household and 
corporate debt-to-GDP ratios are found to be positively associated with a greater probability of 
systemic banking crises in the future (see Table 4). Moreover, changes in household debt are found 
to be more important than levels (Column 3), while the effects of household debt seem to dominate 
those of corporate debt (Column 4).11 The average marginal effect of changes in household debt 
is about 1 percentage point, almost double the effect of firm debt increases. When household debt 
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is high, the probability of systemic banking crises is boosted by another 80 basis points. In 
economic terms, these are important effects, given that the unconditional crisis probability is about 
3.5 percent for the countries considered in this analysis. 12 
Table 4 here 
We also find that the relation between increasing household debt and financial crises is 
more pronounced when the household debt level exceeds 65 percent of GDP (Column 5). This 
suggests that a given increase in debt of already highly-indebted households is likely to result in a 
debt overhang. In such situations, households must either drastically reduce consumption or 
default on their debt. Similarly, the probability of a banking crisis is larger when levels of sovereign 
debt are high (above 60% of GDP), suggesting that the probability of a systemic banking crisis 
increases when the government capacity to support banks is more constrained (Column 6).  
Neglected downside risk. Next, we investigate whether behavioral biases may help explain the 
negative relationship between household debt and future GDP.13 For example, households and 
professional investors may have extrapolative expectations about future house prices, such as 
during the 2000s housing boom in the US (Cheng et al. 2014). Similarly, systematic mispricing of 
risks can happen when investors have a tendency to think that ‘this time is different’ (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2014). This would be in line with the view that investor sentiment helps explain 
fluctuations in economic activities (López-Salido et al. 2017). 
To empirically test for behavioral biases, we examine whether past growth in household 
debt is systematically associated with future lower banking equity returns, because banks are 
generally the most exposed to household debt. A negative correlation between past household 
credit growth and future equity returns would indicate that investors in financial markets are, on 
average, overly optimistic during household credit booms. As in the previous subsection, we 
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emphasize the role of household debt (as opposed to total debt) in mispricing of risk. Moreover, 
we test whether household debt can predict both bank stock excess returns as well as abnormal 
returns. The latter may tell whether, compared to the overall market, banking stocks are 
particularly affected by the neglect of crash risk associated with household credit. This finding 
may have significant policy relevance because mispricing of risk in the banking sector would 
suggest that the banking sector requires a larger capital buffer to sustain large negative shocks than 
implied by market prices and corresponding risk measures (e.g., those derived from value-at-risk 
models). It also provides a rationale for regulators to implement macroprudential policies, which 
are not based on current market prices but on systemic events including a sudden drop in asset 
prices. 
Predictability of bank stock returns. Following Baron and Xiong (2017), we run the regression 
below: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑓𝑓 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 ⋅ Δ𝑘𝑘ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾 ⋅ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑓𝑓  is the h-year ahead excess return (relative to the risk-free rate) for country i’s 
banking sector index, Δ𝑘𝑘ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ≡ �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻𝐺𝐺�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  is the past k-year growth in the 
household debt to GDP ratio, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 includes a list of controls, such as, importantly, the past k-
year growth in the corporate debt to GDP ratio. Note that the regressors are all variables known at 
time t, whereas the dependent variable measures the innovation in the equity index from time t to 
t+h. Predictability would suggest the existence of mispricing in the stock market, possibly a 
neglect of crash risk.  
The dataset covers 70 countries between 1973 and 2016 where data on bank equity returns 
are available. Both country- and year-fixed effects are included in the regressions. To address the 
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potential issue that growth in the household debt ratio may differ across emerging and advanced 
economies, we follow Baron and Xiong (2017) and normalize this variable by the standard 
deviation of the annual changes in the ratio for each country. Thus, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 can be easily 
interpreted as the predicted h-year ahead excess return for each standard deviation increase in the 
household debt ratio. In the main specification, we choose h=1, 3, 5 and k=3. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. Results are very similar if standard errors are two-way clustered at 
the country-year level or bootstrapped.  
Regression results are reported in in Panel A of Table 5, where Columns 1 and 2 show the 
regression coefficients for the forecasting horizon of k=1 year. The findings suggest that the past 
three-year change in the household debt ratio is negatively associated with one-year ahead bank 
equity returns. The relationship remains statistically significant after controlling for past changes 
in the corporate debt ratio, as well as past levels of the household debt and corporate debt ratios. 
In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in the annual 
growth of the household debt ratio is associated with a lower equity return of 2 to 2.7 percent one 
year later.  
Table 5 here 
Columns 3–4 and 5–6 of Table 5 (Panel A) report the regression results that extend the 
forecasting horizons to three and five years, respectively. These results show that the relationship 
between past growth in the household debt ratio and future bank equity returns becomes strongly 
significant. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of past growth in the corporate debt ratio, 
which by itself also has statistically significant predictive power for (lower) future equity returns. 
In terms of the magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the annual growth rate of the 
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household debt ratio is associated with lower equity returns of 12 to 15 percent at the three- and 
five-year horizons.14  
Abnormal returns of bank stocks. Is the neglect of crash risk mainly a banking sector phenomenon? 
We conduct a two-stage analysis to test whether household debt may be more strongly associated 
with the performance of the banking sector than the market. In the first stage, we estimate the 
relative performance of banking sector stocks to the overall market. In the second stage, we 
examine whether past growth in household credit is associated with abnormal bank equity 
returns.15  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression results of Stage 2, where the forecasting horizon 
k ranges from one to three years. Our results indicate that past three-year growth in the household 
debt ratio is associated with negative future abnormal returns for the banking sector. The 
relationship is statistically significant at the two- to three-year horizon. In Columns 2, 4, and 6, the 
past three-year change in the corporate debt ratio is included as a control variable, and the results 
remain unaltered. Note that our analysis is restricted to 30 countries only due to data availability. 
In this subsample of countries, the corporate debt ratio is also negatively (and slightly more 
strongly) correlated with future banking sector abnormal returns. Hence, these results suggest that 
neglect of crash risk associated with household debt is indeed a particular concern for the banking 
sector. 
Debt overhang: micro-level evidence. Aggregate private consumption fell more in the aftermath 
of the crisis in countries which experienced a steeper increase in household debt before the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), while consumption increased modestly in countries with moderate 
household credit growth (see Figure 3). A similar picture is found in micro-level data (see Figure 
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4). This suggests that the rise in household debt can give rise to overleveraging and fragilities in 
the financial system. 
Figures 3 here  
Figure 4 here  
To test whether household indebtedness helps explain the drop in consumption we estimate 
the following cross-sectional regression at the household level with changes in household food 
consumption (percent of income) as the dependent variable: 
Δ𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,2014 = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,2010 + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 
where debt-to-income ratio (DTIi,2010) is a proxy for past household indebtedness. Here, household 
characteristics (such as size of household main residence, employment, education, and age of the 
reference person) are considered as Controls. In addition, the model includes country fixed effects 
(𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐) and errors are clustered at the country level.16  
The main finding of Table 6 is that higher indebtedness, proxied by debt-to-income or 
loan-to-value ratios, makes households more vulnerable to income shocks. This analysis takes into 
consideration the level of household indebtedness in 2010, right before the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The negative effects of an exogenous shock on household consumption are intensified 
when the level of indebtedness exceeds a certain threshold (e.g., total debt more than 300% of 
household disposable income). In other words, consumption declined more for the most indebted 
households, often perceived as more financially constrained. In terms of economic magnitude, a 
100-percentage point increase DTI ratio translates into a 4 percentage points drop in consumption. 
However, this magnitude is much larger (about 7 percentage points) for households with total debt 
more than 300 percent of disposable income. Consistent with Mian et al. (2013), these results 
confirm the debt overhang channel for the European households in this analysis and support the 
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macro-level results presented above. Robustness checks reinforce our findings. Even when 
controlling for household characteristics such as age, size, education, employment and net wealth, 
and time-invariant country features, these results hold (see Table 6, Columns 5-7). 
Table 6 here 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents evidence to suggest that high growth in household borrowing is 
negatively associated with economic growth over the medium term over the business cycle. 
Together, these findings suggest that household debt should be monitored vigilantly and 
incorporated into financial stability and macroeconomic policy frameworks.  
Our results generalize the findings by Mian et al. (2017), who first documented a negative 
debt-GDP growth relationship for 30 advanced economies. Here we extend the analysis to 80 
advanced and emerging market and developing economies spanning 65 years (1950–2016). In 
terms of the magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the household debt ratio is, on average, 
associated with a 1.2 percentage point lower output growth in the following three years. This effect 
appears stronger for advanced economies than for emerging markets. 
We also show that country characteristics such as flexible exchange rates, capital account 
openness, and higher financial development help mitigate the risks associated with increasing 
household debt. Our broad sample coverage of 80 countries allows for this in-depth analysis of the 
role played by institutional factors, relative to earlier studies that used smaller and more 
homogeneous country samples. We also examine the macro effects of household debt, conditional 
on micro-household level and country characteristics in a smaller sample.  We find that higher 
participation by low-income households, suggestive of greater financial inclusion, appears to 
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reduce the negative effect of household debt on medium-term GDP growth, while a higher debt 
share, potentially reflecting a potential debt overhang effect, is associated with a more negative 
effect.  
Last, we present evidence on three complementary mechanisms through which household 
indebtedness causes future growth to decline. A household debt increases the probability of 
banking crises and is associated with neglected crash risk, and distributional characteristics matter. 
The first mechanism—higher growth in household debt raising the probability of banking crises—
is stronger when the level of household debt is above 65 percent of GDP. This proves that 
economic costs associated with increased household debt are higher in financial crises than during 
normal downturns. The second mechanism—household debt reflecting neglected crash risk—
shows that household credit growth systematically predicts lower bank stock returns (as well as 
higher probability of bank stock crashes) in the next two to three years. Price corrections 
originating from such mispricing generally trigger sharp declines in asset prices, increases in risk 
premiums, and significant reallocation of resources in the economy. The third mechanism—on the 
importance of distributional characteristics of household debt—reveals differences in marginal 
propensities to consume across a large set of European households, whereby those with higher 
financial leverage are more exposed to negative income shocks. 
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Endnotes 
1 Monetary policy may also play a role. See Brunnermeier et al. (2017) for US evidence.  
2 These stylized facts are consistent with IMF (2017). 
3 See Alter et al. (2018) for more detail of country coverage, data and sources. 
4 All regressions include lagged GDP growth for the preceding two years as controls. Results are 
also robust to including the past three-year change in the government debt to GDP ratio.  
5 Assuming the total supply of goods in the economy is determined by the total demand. 
6 We further confirm that this result is not driven by euro-area countries alone. Regression results 
remain statistically significant at the 10 percent level when the interaction of past household debt 
growth and the euro area dummy is also included as an additional control. 
7 For a discussion of the distributional aspects of household assets and liabilities in the international 
context, see Badarinza et al. (2016a, 2016b). 
8 For a different perspective regarding the distributional aspects of household debt, see also Foote 
et al. (2016) and Albanesi et al. (2017). 
9  For instance, the threshold for HI household debt is considered 65 percent of GDP which 
represents the top quintile of the country-time distribution of the set of countries included in the 
regression, and HI sovereign debt indicator takes value 1 when it exceeds 60 percent of GDP, 
which corresponds to the top-third of the distribution. 
10 As robustness checks, different estimation methods were performed, such as Firth logit, Poisson, 
and Panel logit, yielding very similar results. 
11 Given that we use models with country fixed effects, these results should be interpreted as 
deviations from the country averages. 
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12 Another way to evaluate these relationships is to compare crisis predictability power, using the 
Area Under Curve (AUC) metric as in Jorda and Taylor (2011). See Alter et al. (2018) for these 
additional results. 
13 While we do not directly measure the behavioral bias of household borrowers, Cheng et al.  
(2014) show that such bias is prevalent even for experienced real estate investors.  
14 Note that these negative correlations between past household debt ratio and future bank stock 
returns only consider the deviations from their country averages since country fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. The correct interpretation of the result is that, for countries that have 
similar average growth in stock prices and other conditions, the ones experiencing higher 
household credit growth on average have lower future equity returns than the other countries. 
15 Details of the two-stage regression setup are discussed in Alter et al. (2018). 
16 Micro-level longitudinal data for five euro area countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Malta, 
the Netherlands) for two consecutive waves (2010 and 2014) with panel dimension are utilized;  
population weights are considered. There are about 3000 households with borrowing and 
consumption information.  
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Figure 1. Household debt: evidence from cross-country panel data (%, unless noted otherwise) 
 
Panel 1: Advanced economies 
 
Panel 2: Emerging market economies 
 
 
Note: Panels show the cross-country dispersion of household debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF’s October 2017 Global Financial Stability Report. 
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Figure 2. Household debt: evidence from cross-country micro-level data (% unless notes 
otherwise  
 
Panel 1: DTI, by income quintile (medians, all 
borrowers) 
 
 
Panel 2: DTA, by income quintile (all borrowers, 
medians) 
 
Panel 3: LTV, by income quintile (mortgages, medians)   
 
  
 
 
Panel 3: Mortgages (participation rate by income quintile) 
 
Notes: Data refers to 2013 country level household surveys, or latest available. Panels 1-4 show 
the cross-country dispersion across income quantiles, evaluated at the median for mortgage 
borrowers (quintile 1 to quantile 5, from lowest to highest income). 
 
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; country panel surveys; Euro Area Housing Finance 
Network; Luxembourg Wealth Study; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD); US Survey of Consumer Finance; and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3. Europe: debt overhang and consumption (macro-level) 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the country-level relationship between change in real private 
consumption after the crisis (2008–2013) and change in household debt (percent of GDP) before 
the crisis (2001–2007.) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF’s October 2017 Global Financial Stability 
Report. 
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Figure 4. Euro Area Households: Debt Overhang and Consumption (Micro-level) 
 
Note: This figure depicts the relationship between change in household consumption-to-income 
ratio and past indebtedness (DTI). Household survey data from euro area countries with a panel 
dimension (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands) are considered. The change in 
consumption-to-income ratio is computed over 2010–2014. DTI = debt-to-income ratio. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the euro area Household Finance and Consumption 
Survey of 2010 and 2014. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
  N Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
HHD/GDP 2299 35.4 27.4 6.02 13.4 30.0 51.0 72.4 
Δ (HHD/GDP) 2184 1.02 2.56 -1.39 -0.22 0.84 2.19 3.94 
Δ3 (HHD/GDP) 2024 3.22 5.89 -2.75 0.01 2.76 6.13 10.45 
CD/GDP 2257 60.8 48.8 16.7 28.4 53.9 81.0 109.0 
Δ (CD/GDP) 2142 0.97 9.51 -4.15 -1.20 0.75 3.00 5.96 
Δ3 (CD/GDP) 1982 2.98 18.97 -7.46 -2.06 2.43 7.04 13.15 
PD/GDP 2247 96.4 66.6 25.8 47.3 84.9 130.6 177.2 
Δ (PD/GDP) 2167 1.99 10.22 -4.71 -0.99 1.77 4.53 8.79 
GD/GDP 2807 51.9 90.7 15.0 26.8 42.1 65.1 89.4 
Δ (GD/GDP) 2727 0.15 5.85 -5.90 -2.27 -0.04 2.65 6.19 
Δ ln(RGDP) 4190 3.66 5.00 -0.75 1.83 3.96 6.12 8.39 
Δ3 ln(RGDP) 4030 11.19 11.09 0.87 6.27 11.53 16.98 22.58 
Δ ln(RPVC) 3347 3.42 6.39 -1.78 1.13 3.40 6.09 9.50 
Δ (PVC/GDP) 3413 -0.48 9.14 -2.37 -0.97 -0.04 0.76 2.14 
Δ ln (RHP) 1629 1.78 9.68 -8.08 -2.28 1.83 6.02 11.62 
Δ3 UNEMP 2766 0.002 0.027 -0.025 -0.010 0.000 0.012 0.031 
Δ3 INT 2278 -0.03 0.57 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 
Δ3 REER 2662 -0.00 0.20 -0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.15 
INT, % 2501 15.70 54.63 4.21 6.08 9.20 14.81 25.80 
KA OPEN 2983 0.47 1.58 -1.38 -1.19 0.13 2.39 2.39 
FIN DEV 2755 0.39 0.24 0.11 0.21 0.35 0.55 0.74 
FIN RISK 2455 35.91 10.24 25.5 33 38 42 46 
TRANSPAR 127 0.8189 0.3866 0 1 1 1 1 
INC HIGH 20 811 45.57 8.389 36.5 39.17 42.54 51.4 58.88 
INC LOW 20 811 6.40 2.32 3.17 4.52 6.7 8.3 9.28 
BNK CRISIS 5360 0.016 0.126 0 0 0 0 0 
BNK RET 1YR 1768 6.20 43.82 -37.06 -12.65 6.13 27.43 49.66 
BNK RET 3YR 1630 19.78 75.36 -56.56 -13.85 18.48 57.94 100.12 
BNK RET 5YR 1492 32.05 101.29 -63.42 -12.40 34.55 81.38 134.11 
AB RET 3YR  4095 -3.99 51.20 -57.47 -23.99 -0.33 22.52 48.16 
 
Note: This table presents summary statistics of the variables used, following Alter et al. (2018). 
Log changes and ratios are reported in percentages or percentage points. ∆ and ∆3 denote to one-
year and three-year changes. The variables HHD/GDP, CD/GDP, PD/GDP, GD/GDP, RGDP, 
RPVC, PVC/GDP, RHP, UNEMP, INT, REER, KA OPEN, FIN DEV, FIN RISK, TRANSPAR, 
INC HIGH 20, INC LOW 20, BNK CRISIS, BNK RET 1YR, BNK RET 3YR, BNK RET 5YR 
and AB RET 3YR denote household debt to GDP, non-financial firm debt to GDP, government 
debt to GDP, real GDP, real private consumption, private consumption to GDP, real house 
prices, unemployment rate, short-term interest rates, real effective exchange rates, capital 
account openness, financial development, financial risk index, credit bureau availability, income 
share of the richest 20 percent, income share of the poorest 20 percent, systemic bank crisis 
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dummy, bank stock return one year ahead, bank stock return three years ahead, bank stock return 
five years ahead, and abnormal return three years ahead. N = number of observations; p10, p25, 
p75, p90 = 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentile; p50 = median. 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations
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Table 2. Household debt and future GDP growth 
 
Panel A. All countries in the analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable: Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+2 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+3 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+4 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+5 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+6 
        
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.112*** 
(0.039) 
-0.180*** 
(0.053) 
-0.211*** 
(0.058) 
-0.185*** 
(0.055) 
-0.146*** 
(0.045) 
-0.122*** 
(0.044) 
Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.051* 
(0.026) 
N 1,903 1,823 1,743 1,663 1,583 1,503 1,421 
Number of Countries 80 80 80 80 80 80 78 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 R2 0.88 0.65 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42 
 
Panel B. Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Advanced Economies  Emerging Markets 
Dependent Variable: Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+3 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+5 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+7  Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+3 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+5 Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+7 
          
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.081** 
(0.036) 
-0.207*** 
(0.064) 
-0.146*** 
(0.054) 
-0.037 
(0.047) 
 -0.156*  
(0.085) 
-0.111  
(0.138) 
-0.024 
(0.093) 
-0.249** 
(0.100) 
Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.026+ 
(0.017) 
0.054** 
(0.023) 
 -0.087** 
(0.038) 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
-0.062 
(0.053) 
0.048 
(0.064) 
N 1,203 1,125 1,047 969  620 538 456 374 
Number of Countries 39 39 39 39  41 41 41 39 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
 R2 0.71 0.49 0.47 0.47  0.62 0.41 0.43 0.48 
 
Note: This table presents results from estimating Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 for 𝑘𝑘 = 0, … ,6. All 
regressions control for country and time fixed effects, and lagged GDP growth for the preceding two years. Standard errors are dually 
clustered on country and year. ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. Panel A 
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presents the results based on all countries analyzed. Panel B splits the sample into Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets. 
Sample is an unbalanced panel between 1950 and 2016 at an annual frequency. 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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Table 3. The role of institutional factors, policies, and household-level debt characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Institutional Factors and Policies  Household-level Debt Characteristics 
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 -0.058 
(0.043) 
0.029 
(0.073) 
0.056 
(0.076) 
-0.289*** 
(0.074) 
-0.261* 
(0.150) 
-0.273*** 
(0.067) 
 -0.303*** 
(0.088) 
-0.258** 
(0.106) 
-0.251** 
(0.117) 
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 -0.247** 
(0.100) 
 -0.223** 
(0.104) 
       
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾  -0.250** 
(0.108) 
-0.184* 
(0.108) 
       
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹    0.243** 
(0.101) 
      
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇     0.158+ 
(0.102) 
     
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾      0.122* 
(0.074) 
    
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿        0.272*** 
(0.106) 
  
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹         0.222 
(0.143) 
0.216  
(0.147) 
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸          -0.086 
(0.170) 
N 1,503 1,333 1,333 1,503 1,285 1,126  835 784 784 
Number of Countries 80 77 77 80 68 76  30 25 25 
 R2 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.37  0.53 0.54 0.54 
 
Note: This table presents results from Δ3𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑘𝑘 where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the 
dummy variable for institutional factors, including fixed exchange rate regime (FIXED), high capital account openness (KAOPEN), high 
financial development (FINDEV), transparency of consumer credit (Transparency), high low-income households mortgage participation 
(LowIncPart), low financial risk (FINRISK), low debt-to-income of low-income households (LowDTI), and emerging market economies 
(EM). FIXED = 1 if the country has a fixed exchange rate regime. KAOPEN = 1 if financial openness index is higher than the median. 
FINDEV = 1 if the Financial Development Index is within the top 25 percent of countries as of 2014. Transparency = 1 if consumer 
credit transparency index is 1. LowIncPart = 1 if the mortgage participation rate for the bottom 4 percent of households in the income 
distribution is within the top 25 percent of countries in the most recent year where data are available. FINRISK = 1 if financial risk rating 
is above the median (higher rating indicates less risk). LowDTI = 1 if the weighted debt-to-income ratio for the bottom 40 percent of 
households (mortgage borrowers) in the income distribution is within the lower 25 percent of countries in the most recent year where 
data are available. In the regressions for FIXED and KAOPEN, the indicator itself is included as a control variable. All regressions also 
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include past growth in non-financial corporate debt (Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1), country and time fixed effects, and lagged GDP growth for the preceding 
two years. Standard errors are dually clustered on country and year. ***, **, *  indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4. Probability of systemic banking crisis 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable:                                                                      Systemic Banking Crises 
                
ℎℎ𝑑𝑑 4.037***   2.501*** 1.270 1.727 2.091 2.479 
  (0.783)   (0.925) (1.276) (1.384) (1.716) (1.760) 
Δℎℎ𝑑𝑑   40.05*** 35.01*** 35.60*** 31.25*** 30.86*** 26.47*** 
    (6.482) (6.334) (7.161) (7.310) (8.451) (8.726) 
fd       0.879 0.974 0.536 0.647 
        (0.761) (0.690) (0.743) (0.689) 
Δfd       13.13*** 12.64*** 15.62*** 15.33*** 
        (3.954) (3.706) (4.220) (3.900) 
Δℎℎ𝑑𝑑 x  
        I(Hi Gov Debt)         22.62*   24.12* 
          (12.49)   (12.44) 
I(Hi Gov Debt)         -0.644   -0.739 
          (0.602)   (0.669) 
Δℎℎ𝑑𝑑 x 
         I(Hi hhd)           24.41* 25.93* 
            (14.11) (13.43) 
I(Hi hhd)           -1.355 -1.346 
            (0.896) (0.832) 
Constant -5.949*** -3.741*** -5.465*** -5.224*** -5.517*** -5.253*** -5.534*** 
  (0.594) (0.150) (0.681) (0.732) (0.800) (0.902) (0.944) 
                
N 1,223 1,033 1,033 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
COU Cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
COU FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
AUC 0.700 0.791 0.806 0.840 0.845 0.850 0.856 
No of Crises 46 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Countries 40 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Preudo R2 0.0612 0.142 0.153 0.204 0.212 0.218 0.228 
Note: This table presents results from estimating a logit panel as follows:  𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]
𝑃𝑃[𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=0|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] =
Ψ0i +Ψ1𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +Ψ2𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 x I(Hi Debt)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡; where 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the banking crisis dummy variable. hhd 
and Δhhd are level and first difference in household debt-to-gdp ratio. fd and Δfd are level and 
first difference in non-financial corporate debt-to-gdp ratio. High household debt I(Hi hhd) is a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 if level of household debt exceeds 65 percent of GDP, 
representing the top quintile of the distribution. High government debt I(Hi Gov Debt) is a 
dummy variable with threshold set at 60 percent of GDP, representing the top third of the 
distribution. All independent variables are lagged. The third lag of household debt change is 
utilized, based on explanatory power and robustness presented in Table 5a. Banking crises are 
taken from the updated database by Laeven and Valencia (2013). AUC stands for area under 
curve. Country fixed effects (COU FE) are considered. Errors are clustered at the country level. 
***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5. Bank equity returns and crashes 
 
Panel A. Future Bank Stock Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
   
 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5  
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 -0.020* 
(0.011) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.120*** 
(0.032) 
-0.113*** 
(0.037) 
-0.159*** 
(0.050) 
-0.123*** 
(0.055) 
 
Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  -0.029 
(0.021) 
 -0.106* 
(0.053) 
 -0.183** 
(0.071) 
 
ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−3  -0.398** 
(0.189) 
 -0.695 
(0.433) 
 -0.640 
(0.669) 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−3  -0.010 
(0.092) 
 -0.117 
(0.233) 
 -0.234 
(0.355) 
 
COU FE Y Y Y Y Y Y  
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y  
N 1,488 1,319 1,348 1,319 1,208 1,179  
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70  
R2 0.27 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37  
 
Panel B. Abnormal Returns for Bank Stocks  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
   
 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5  
Δ3ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 -0.049 
(0.063) 
0.003 
(0.069) 
-0.228*** 
(0.079) 
-0.145* 
(0.083) 
-0.289* 
(0.090) 
-0.289*** 
(0.097) 
 
Δ3𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  -0.198** 
(0.081) 
 -0.401*** 
(0.098) 
 -0.479*** 
(0.114) 
 
ℎℎ𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−3  -0.081 
(0.112) 
 -0.503*** 
(0.134) 
 -0.723*** 
(0.161) 
 
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−3  -0.130 
(0.104) 
 -0.187 
(0.125) 
 -0.239 
(0.151) 
 
COU FE Y Y Y Y Y Y  
N 723 723 722 722 693 693  
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30  
R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.11  
 
 
 
Note: This table presents the relationship between past household debt growth and future bank 
stock returns (Panel A) and between past household debt growth and future abnormal returns for 
bank stocks (Panel B). Abnormal returns are defined as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
residuals. Market betas are estimated for each country in each year based on past quarterly stock 
price data to avoid using unknown information at the time. Forecasting horizon k ranges from 
one to five years. Country fixed effects (COU FE) are considered in both panels, and year fixed 
effects in Panel A. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, *, indicate 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Source: Authors’ Calculations
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Table 6. Euro area: household debt overhang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This table presents the relationship between past household indebtedness and changes in consumption to income ratio in 
a cross-section of euro area households. DTI = debt-to-income ratio; LTV = loan-to-value ratio; I(DTI>300) is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if DTI exceeds 300 percent, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include country fixed effects (COU FE) and 
household net wealth dummies. Country-clustered robust errors in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate statistical significance at the 
1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  Dependent Variable: Change in Consumption to Income Ratio 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DTI (lag) -0.0396***   -0.0404***   -0.0401***   -0.0152* 
  (0.00235)   (0.00183)   (0.00226)   (0.00619) 
LTV (mortgages, lag)   -0.123***   -0.128**   -0.131***   
    (0.0218)   (0.0302)   (0.0154)   
DTI x I(DTI>300) (lag)             -0.0537*** 
              (0.00816) 
I(DTI>300) (lag)             26.32*** 
              (2.010) 
Size of household main residence         0.0294** -0.0506* 0.0200* 
          (0.00694) (0.0173) (0.00779) 
Education of reference person         0.986*** 0.557 0.721*** 
          (0.0584) (2.923) (0.108) 
Age of reference person         0.110 0.116 0.132** 
          (0.0469) (0.0720) (0.0264) 
Unemployment         -4.096 10.59 -3.451 
          (3.693) (8.163) (3.114) 
Constant 0.840* -3.417*** 0.348 25.44** -11.54** 21.59** -13.32** 
  (0.333) (0.377) (1.429) (6.631) (3.487) (4.775) (2.627) 
                
N 2,925 699 2,925 699 2,744 656 2,744 
R2 0.102 0.059 0.103 0.113 0.109 0.133 0.142 
COU FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Net Wealth dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster Country Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
